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Introduction
Andrea Yates, a former nurse and high school valedicto-
rian, lived in Houston, Texas with her husband and five chil-
dren ranging in age from six months to seven years.' She
suffered from long-term severe depression and tried to commit
suicide. 2 In March of 2001 Yates was hospitalized where she
* Jean K. Gilles Phillips is the Director of the Paul E. Wilson Defender Project
and an Associate Clinical Professor of Law at the University of Kansas School of
Law.
t Rebecca E. Woodman is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Washburn Univer-
sity School of Law and counsel in the Kansas Capital Appellate Defender Office.
1. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Developments in Other State Courts, 25 DEV.
MENTAL HEALTH L. 130, 136 (2006); Jury Finds Yates Insane, Not Guilty, Hous-
TON CHRONICLE, July 26, 2006, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
front/4073570.html.
2. Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215, 216-17 (Tex. App. 2005).
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was observed to be in a catatonic state and possibly delusional. 3
Upon her discharge doctors advised that she not be left alone.
4
On June 10, 2001, while left alone with her five children,
Yates systematically drowned them one by one. She then called
911. 5 When the police arrived Yates explained that she had to
kill her children because she was a bad mother and had dam-
aged them. According to Yates, the only way to protect her chil-
dren from Satan and ensure their place in Heaven was to kill
them.6
Yates was charged with capital murder. There was no dis-
pute that Yates had killed her children and she relied on an
insanity defense at trial. After her conviction was reversed on
appeal,7 she was found not guilty by reason of insanity following
a second trial. Texas statutes provide an affirmative defense to
a charged crime if the defendant, "as a result of severe mental
disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong."8
Jury foreman Todd Frank explained: "[we understand that she
knew it was legally wrong. But in her delusional mind, in her
severely mentally ill mind, we believe that she thought what
she did was right."9 Yates was committed to a maximum secur-
ity state hospital until such time as a court decides that she
does not pose a danger to herself or others. 10
In Flagstaff, Arizona, on June 21, 2000, 17 year-old Eric
Clark, in a delusional state, shot and killed Officer Jeffrey Mor-
tiz, believing him to be an alien.1" It was undisputed that Clark
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. At trial classmates,
school officials and family described Clark's increasingly bizarre
behavior and paranoid conduct. Lay and expert testimony re-
vealed that Clark believed Flagstaff was populated by aliens
3. Id. at 217.
4. Id. at 217.
5. Id. at 218.
6. Hafemeister, supra note 1, at 136.
7. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 222.
8. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (Vernon 2003).
9. Paul J. Weber, Andrea Yates Ex-Husband Says Prosecutors' Case 'Built
On Lies' ASSOCIATED PRESS (Houston), July 28, 2006, available at http://abclocal.
go.com/kabc/story?section=nationworld&id=4410036.
10. Jury Finds Yates Insane, Not Guilty, supra note 1.
11. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 2717 (2006).
456 [Vol. 28:455
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss3/1
2008] THE INSANITY OF THE MENS REA MODEL 457
who were trying to kill him and that bullets were the only way
to stop them. 12
Clark was charged with first degree murder. He did not
contest the shooting, but argued that he was insane at the time
it occurred. Like Texas, Arizona statutes provide an affirmative
defense if the accused establishes that he was "afflicted with a
mental disease or defect of such severity that the person did not
know the criminal act was wrong."13 Clark waived his right to a
jury trial and received a bench trial. The judge issued a special
verdict expressly finding that Clark had failed to show that he
was insane at the time of the shooting. Although the trial judge
concluded that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophre-
nia, the court determined that Clark's mental illness "did not
... distort his perception of reality so severely that he did not
know his actions were wrong."14 Clark was sentenced to life in
prison.15
The different results in Yates and Clark turned on the evi-
dence presented and the ability of trial counsel to convince the
trier of fact that the individual charged did not understand
their conduct to be wrong. The case of Michael Bethel, however,
is dramatically different. Unlike Yates and Clark, Bethel was
not even given the opportunity to present such a defense.
Bethel's crime occurred in Kansas, one of four states to have
legislatively abolished the insanity defense.
On February 7, 2000, in Girard, Kansas, Michael Bethel
shot and killed his father, step-mother and a home-healthcare
nurse. Bethel, who began to experience the onset of mental ill-
ness in 1995, had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. 16
After five years of continual mental deterioration, Bethel told
police that God had commanded the killings and that "all three
parties .. .were jointly involved in a 'stage set' in which the
three individuals would soon metamorphos[e] [sic] into a new
level of existence."'1 7 According to psychiatric testimony, Bethel
12. Id. at 2717.
13. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-502(A) (LexisNexis 2007).
14. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2718 (quoting Minute Entry from Joint Appendix Vol.
II at 334, Arizona v. Clark, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2003) (No. 05-5966)).
15. Id.
16. Transcripts of the Record on Appeal Volume IV, State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d
840 (Kan. 2003) (No. 87989).
17. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 843.
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was mentally impaired and lacked the substantial capacity for
judgment at the time of the shootings.'
Like Yates and Clark, Bethel did not contest that he shot
and killed three people. Like Yates and Clark, there was no
dispute that Bethel suffered from a severe mental illness that
caused his delusions. 19 In Bethel's case, he believed that God
told him to kill those three people in order to rid them of evil
and that his father and the other two victims would then be
reincarnated as younger, good, versions of themselves. 20 Conse-
quently, like Yates and Clark, Bethel's sole defense was that his
conduct was the result of his severe mental illness.21 Unlike
Yates and Clark, however, Bethel was prohibited from raising
insanity as an affirmative defense to the crimes charged.22
Since Kansas abolished the affirmative defense of insanity
in 1996,23 the sole question for the trier of fact was whether
Bethel intended to shoot the three victims. 24 Yet, because
Bethel was not contesting his commission of the act, the defense
that Bethel's lack of intent was the result of his mental illness
was irrelevant. Bethel was charged with capital murder and
proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts in exchange for
the prosecutor's recommendation of a life sentence. At sentenc-
ing, the court found that, while Bethel was a dangerous person,
he was not an evil person and imposed the recommended sen-
tence of life imprisonment. 25
18. Transcripts of the Record on Appeal, Volume XV at 7, Bethel, 66 P.3d 840
(No. 87989).
19. See id. at vol. XIV.
20. Id. at 947.
21. Id. at Stipulated Facts.
22. Id.
23. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 844.
24. The Kansas statute now reads: "It is a defense to a prosecution under any
statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the
mental state required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or
defect is not otherwise a defense. The provisions of this section shall be in force
and take effect on and after January 1, 1996." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220 (1996).
25. Transcript of Record on Appeal at 24, Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (No. 87989).
Interestingly enough, although Bethel could have been subject to the death pen-
alty for a conviction of capital murder, the fact that insanity is no longer an affirm-
ative defense in Kansas may have prohibited his execution. The United States
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State
from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane." Ford v.
Wainwright 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). "The prohibition applies despite a pris-
[Vol. 28:455458
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Despite significant debate over the appropriate legal and
medical standards for insanity,26 the majority of jurisdictions
and even the Supreme Court of the United States seem to ac-
cept that legal capacity for criminal responsibility, or moral
blameworthiness, in some form, is constitutionally mandated as
an affirmative defense to criminal liability.27 While various ju-
risdictions have adopted different tests for insanity,28 the
oner's earlier competency to be held responsible for committing a crime and tried
for it." Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S.Ct 2842, 2847-48 (2007).
26. See generally Stephen Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente
Between Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona (University of Penn-
sylvania Law School, Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper 143 (2007), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/143); Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709
(2006).
27. All states that have evaluated the question held that due process requires
some type of avenue for the consideration of mental illness as a factor in assessing
criminal reliability. Those states that have abolished the affirmative defense of
insanity merely determined, for reasons that will be addressed in Part III, that
imbedding consideration of mental illness in a pure elements notion of mens rea
comports with due process. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 917 (Idaho 1990);
State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 844 (Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 999
(Mont. 1984); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 364 (Utah 1995). The Supreme
Court in Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (2006), held that the ability of Clark to
present his defense of insanity was provided for. Id. at 2722. And while the Court
declined to resolve the question of whether the insanity defense was constitution-
ally required, the Court also declined to hold that such a defense was not constitu-
tionally required. Id. at 2722 n.20. In Finger v. State, the Supreme Court of
Nevada specifically held that an affirmative defense of insanity is constitutionally
required. Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
28. As many as sixteen states use the M'Naughten test, wherein the accused
is not responsible for his or her conduct if, as a result of mental illness, the accused
did not know the nature and quality of his actions or did not know that what he
was doing was wrong. See Korell, 690 P.2d at 999. Some states have broadened
the scope of the M'Naughten rule to include those who knew that their actions
were wrong but who, as a result of a "disease of the mind," were unable to exercise
control over their actions. This "irresistible impulse" test, or volitional standard, is
used to supplement the M'Naughten rule in approximately five states. Many
states follow a variation of the American Law Institute ("ALI") test which is a com-
bination of the M'Naughten test and the "irresistible impulse" test. The ALI stan-
dard states that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law. MODEL PENAL CODE, §4.01. Among those
states that follow the Model Penal Code test, some favor the word "wrongfulness"
instead of "criminality." Still others remove the word "substantial." New Hamp-
shire is the only state which follows the Durham rule or "product" test. As set
forth in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), "an ac-
cused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect." Three other states have adopted unique standards
5
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strength and weaknesses of the varying tests are not at issue
here. Rather, it is the complete abolition of insanity as an ex-
trinsic, affirmative defense that is the focus of this article.
Like Kansas, 29 Montana, 30 Idaho,31 and Utah32 have re-
placed their respective insanity defense statutes with what has
been termed the Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule.33 Under this
drawing in part from the cognitive right-wrong language of the M'Naughten rule
and the "irresistible impulse" test while adding other considerations, such as "pre-
vailing community standards" and "legal and moral aspects of responsibility."
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 914. See also, Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2720-21. See generally I.
KEILITZ & J.P. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A GUIDE
FOR POLICYMAKERS (Institute on Mental Disability & the Law, National Center for
State Courts 1984).
29. See supra note 24.
30. "Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect or
developmental disability is admissible to prove that the defendant did or did not
have a state of mind that is an element of the offense." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-
102 (2003).
31. (1) Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal
conduct.
(2) If by the provisions of section 19-2523, Idaho Code, the court finds that
one convicted of crime suffers from any mental condition requiring treat-
ment, such person shall be committed to the board of correction or such city
or county official as provided by law for placement in an appropriate facility
for treatment, having regard for such conditions of security as the case may
require. In the event a sentence of incarceration has been imposed, the de-
fendant shall receive treatment in a facility which provides for incarceration
or less restrictive confinement. In the event that a course of treatment thus
commenced shall be concluded prior to the expiration of the sentence im-
posed, the offender shall remain liable for the remainder of such sentence,
but shall have credit for time incarcerated for treatment.
(3) Nothing herein is intended to prevent the admission of expert evidence
on the issue of any state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject
to the rules of evidence.
IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (2004).
32. (1) (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance
that the defendant as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state
required as an element of the offense charged.
(b) Mental illness is not otherwise a defense, but may be evidence in mitiga-
tion of the penalty in a capital felony under Section 76-3-207 and may be
evidence of special mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or
attempted criminal homicide offense under Section 76-5-205.5.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as "in-
sanity" and "diminished mental capacity."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (2003).
33. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 917 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d
840, 844 (Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 999 (Mont. 1984); State v.
Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 364 (Utah 1995).
460
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model, evidence of mental disease or defect is admissible to
show that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged.34 The Mens Rea Model resem-
bles the diminished capacity doctrine, in that it is focused on
the question of whether the defendant's mental state negates an
element of the crime.35 The position taken in this article is that,
by replacing the extrinsic defense of insanity with an eviden-
tiary rule intrinsic to offense elements, the Mens Rea Model un-
constitutionally abolishes an essential category of mens rea
which is concerned with legal capacity as a precondition for
criminal responsibility.
In arguing the Mens Rea Model is unconstitutional, Part I
of the article examines the history of mens rea and establishes
that the legal capacity for criminal responsibility, or moral
blameworthiness, is a deeply rooted principle in American juris-
prudence. Against the historical backdrop of mens rea and the
insanity defense, Part II of the article analyzes the state rulings
that have addressed the Mens Rea Model and concludes that
the state courts fundamentally misunderstand mens rea by de-
fining it as solely one's intent to act. The state court discussion
is followed in Part III by an analysis of the issue in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Clark v. Arizona.36 Although the
Court in Clark failed to resolve the issue, the majority opinion
implicitly acknowledged that an affirmative defense of insanity
may be required by the Due Process Clause. Additionally, Jus-
tice Kennedy's dissent in Clark, which correctly notes the erro-
neous "conflating [of] the insanity defense and the question of
intent,"37 also reads with an affirmation that evidence of legal
incapacity for criminal responsibility must be admitted. 38 By
34. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 844; Korell, 690 P.2d at 999;
Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364.
35. As is discussed in Part IV, evidence of diminished capacity is relevant to
negate the specific intent element of the crime. To this extent, the Mens Rea
Model resembles the doctrine of diminished capacity. However, diminished capac-
ity must not be confused with insanity. As elaborated upon in Part IV, capacity to
form specific intent, which goes to the elements of the crime, and capacity for crim-
inal responsibility, which is extrinsic to the offense elements, are two different
things. See infra note 166.
36. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (2006).
37. Id. at 2746.
38. Id. ("Criminal responsibility involves an inquiry into whether the defen-
dant knew right from wrong, not whether he had the mens rea elements of the
7
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drawing on such firmly rooted principles and current Supreme
Court analysis, Part IV of the article maintains that because
mens rea has two categories-"special" mens rea, which is con-
cerned with the mental element of a particular crime, including
the intent to act, and "general" mens rea, which is extrinsic to
offense elements and is concerned with legal capacity as a pre-
condition for criminal responsibility-both are constitutionally
protected by the Due Process Clause. As the Mens Rea Model
eliminates the category of general mens rea, it is
unconstitutional.
I. History of Mens Rea
There is no question that the category of mens rea that ad-
dresses offense elements is constitutionally required. 39 The
broader question is whether the category of general mens rea
that addresses the legal capacity for criminal responsibility is
also constitutionally required. In other words, does the Consti-
tution require that an accused, who, because of mental illness,
is unable to appreciate his conduct, be able to present that af-
firmative defense to the trier of fact?
The Constitution provides that states cannot deprive an in-
dividual of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness without due
process of law.40 A legislative enactment violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause if it "offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."41 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
offense. While there may be overlap between the two issues, the existence or non-
existence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or non-
existence of the required mental elements of the crime." (citing Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring))).
39. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 132 (1968). See Moris-
sette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (stating that the concept of mens
rea "is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in ma-
ture systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability
and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.").
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
41. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2719 (applies the test to the question of insanity stan-
dards); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (power of the states to
regulate procedures under which its laws are carried must comport with due pro-
cess); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (state law denying a defen-
dant the right to a trial before incarceration on a misdemeanor offense violates due
process).
462 [Vol. 28:455
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history and common law are directive in assessing fundamental
rights.42 Our analysis begins, then, with an examination of the
history of the mens rea doctrine.
The mens rea doctrine is most commonly associated with
the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: an act
does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty.43 As far
back as the Anglo-Saxon period ending around 1100 A.D., moral
liability was entrenched in the criminal law.44 The mens rea
term likely originated in 597 A.D. with St. Augustine and his
writings of evil motive. 45 St. Augustine discussed the necessity
of a "guilty mind" in relation to perjury by stating, "[n]othing
makes the tongue guilty, but a guilty mind."46 Although St. Au-
gustine's sermon focused on perjury, the phrase in Latin,
"[r]eum linguam non facit nisi mens rea," provided the basis for
the evil motive application to all crimes with the mere removal
of the word linguam.47
The basis for the mens rea term originated with church
teachings, which for many years remained isolated from secular
laws.48 While the law provided for criminal liability without
criminal intent or fault, it was the church that taught that the
intent of the person was the most important factor.49 Penance
was determined largely on the moral blameworthiness of the
"sinner.''5 Not surprisingly, the early Anglo-Saxon church
eventually influenced the laws of the time.51 Anglo-Saxon
judges found difficulty in punishing those who were guilty of
42. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (based, in part, on the com-
mon law rule that execution of an insane person violates the Eighth Amendment).
43. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ & RICHARD D. SCHWARTZ,
CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 767 (1974); see also Francis Bowes Sayre,
Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932).
44. See Paul E. Raymond, The Origin and Rise of Moral Liability in Anglo-
Saxon Criminal Law, 15 OR. L. REV. 93, 117 (1936).
45. See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role
of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 654-55;
see also Raymond, supra note 44, at 110.
46. Raymond, supra note 44, at 110 (citing AUGUSTINUS, BEN. SERMONES, no.
180, c. 2).
47. Id. at 110-11.
48. Id.
49. Bowes Sayre, supra note 43, at 983.
50. Id.
51. See Raymond, supra note 44, at 110-11; see also Gardner, supra note 45, at
642-43.
463
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killing another by accident or in self-defense. 52 Although the
laws concerning guilt in these instances did not change at this
point in time, the church's influence sparked a procedural solu-
tion to problems of blameworthiness: a king's pardon.53
By the thirteenth century, the notion of malice as a compo-
nent of mens rea began to emerge. 54 Henry Bracton, a cleric
and judge of that time, influenced the direction of the common
law. 55 Bracton's writings displayed not only a strong roman and
canonist influence that "a crime is not committed unless the in-
tention to injure exists,"56 but suggested a blameworthiness
component as well:
[W]e must consider with what mind (animo) or with what intent
(voluntate) a thing is done, in fact or in judgment, in order that it
may be determined accordingly what action should follow and
what punishment. For take away the will and every act will be
indifferent, because your state of mind gives meaning to your act,
and a crime is not committed unless the intent to injure (nocendi
voluntas) intervene, nor is a theft committed except with the in-
tent to steal.57
In his writings on arson, Bracton relayed the importance of evil
designs, or mala conscienta.58 This element of moral blamewor-
thiness was evidenced by the use of the words "premeditated,"
"madness," "wickedly," "in felony" and "misadventure" in pleas
before the crown during the first part of the thirteenth
century.59
Bracton also provided the basis for the excuse doctrine in
his writings on children and the insane. In at least one transla-
tion, Bracton writes that the insane should not be held crimi-
52. Bowes Sayre, supra note 43, at 980.
53. Id.
54. J. L.L. J. EDWARDS, Mens Rea in Statutory Offences 2 (1955). See also
Gardner, supra note 45, at 641.
55. Gardner, supra note 45, at 655. See also Bowes Sayre, supra note 43, at
984.
56. Gardner, supra note 45, at 657 (citing HENRY D. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968)).
57. . Bowes Sayre, supra note 43, at 985 (citing BRACTON DR LEGIBUS ET CON-
SEUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 101b).
58. EDWARDS, supra note 54, at 2.
59. Raymond, supra note 44, at 117.
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nally liable because they lack mental capacity or reason.60
Similarly, children cannot be held criminally liable because
they lack evil designs. 61 According to one legal scholar,
Bracton's view of mens rea "constituted a normative judgment
of subjective wickedness, requiring not simply that the actor in-
tend to commit the offense, but also that the offense be commit-
ted by a responsible moral agent for wicked purposes."62 Thus
developed the component of moral blameworthiness and in-
sanity as a defense to criminal liability.
After the thirteenth century, moral blameworthiness
helped to distinguish between criminal and civil responsibil-
ity. 63 In the years following Bracton, there grew a "differentia-
tion between the crime and the tort, for the allowance of
damages continued in the main independent of considerations
of moral blameworthiness. '" 64 Moral blameworthiness and "mal-
ice aforethought," however, mirrored the general mens rea re-
quirement requiring an evil motive or intent.65
During this time, defenses continued to evolve around the
concept of mens rea, due in large part to the idea that a "free,
voluntary, and rational choice to do evil" was required for crimi-
nal liability. 66 Like insanity and infancy, self-defense and com-
pulsion emerged as defenses on the grounds that the accused
was not morally blameworthy. "While coerced offenders no
doubt intend their criminal acts, they are excused because their
capacity to function as free and responsible moral agents has
been so compromised by the pressure of the situation that to
punish them would be unfair."67 Consequently, courts began to
60. Bowes Sayre, supra note 43, at 98 (citing BRACTON, supra note 56, at
136b).
61. Id.
62. Gardner, supra note 45, at 663.
63. Bowes Sayre, supra note 43, at 988.
64. Id. at 989-90.
65. Gardner, supra note 45, at 668-69.
66. Id. at 665.
67. Id. at 665 (internal citations omitted). Although defenses such as infancy,
insanity and self-defense were recognized, other excuse defenses such as religious
obligation, lack of knowledge and euthanasia were punished in the usual manner.
Id. at 666-67. Additionally, in the seventeenth century, Eduardo Coke expounded
upon Bracton's ideas concerning malice and arson, "[i]f it be done by mischance, or
negligence, says Coke, it is no felony." EDWARDS, supra note 54, at 2 (citation omit-
ted). While Coke repeated Bracton in regards to express malice, he greatly ex-
panded the idea to include malice implied by the law. For example, Coke believed
465
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excuse defendants who committed certain acts under extreme
duress. This evolution cemented the notion of moral blamewor-
thiness and that the offender must be in a position to make a
free and voluntary choice to commit an evil act.6s By the eight-
eenth century, moral blameworthiness as an essential compo-
nent of mens rea was firmly rooted in English criminal law as
evidenced by Blackstone's statement: "So that to constitute a
crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will;
and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious
will."69
A strict use of evil motive or vicious will did produce some
unpredictable and unjust results. When persons who acted
with an evil motive but achieved an unexpected result were
sometimes declared not guilty of the unintended consequences
of the intended act, the judiciary, in an effort to correct this
strict application of evil motive, began to struggle with identify-
ing a notion of mens rea that became part of the element of the
offense. 70 For the defendant who acted intentionally, mens rea
that the "killings by robbers while in the commission of their robberies" and a kill-
ing that occurs as an accident while in the process of an illegal act were both com-
mitted with a type of malice aforethought and the accused should be held
accountable. Gardner, supra note 45, at 669-70. Consequently, Coke's writings
formed the basis for the modern day felony murder rule while greatly expanding
the notion of malice at the time.
68. Gardner, supra note 45, at 665.
69. Kelly A. Swanson, Criminal Law: Mens Rea Alive and Well: Limiting
Public Welfare Offenses- In re C.R.M., 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1265, 1266-67
(2002) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
20-21).
70. See Gardner, supra note 45, at 673-74.
As courts attempted to clarify the mens rea elements of various offenses,
they often specifically rejected the original evil motive approach in favor of
describing particular states of mind as essential for criminal liability. Thus,
in Regina v. Pembliton, the court quashed Pembliton's conviction for the
statutory offense of "unlawfully and maliciously committing damage... to
the property of another." Pembliton, while drunk, got into a fight with a
group of people in a street lined with houses. In the course of the fight,
Pembliton picked up a large stone and hurled it at the group. The stone flew
over their heads and struck and shattered a plate glass window of one of the
homes along the street. The government argued, seemingly correctly under
the facts, that Pembliton's motive in throwing the stone (a desire to injure
his fellow combatants) was "malicious." The court nevertheless found that
because he did not "intend" to break the window, he did not "maliciously
commit damage" under the statute. The court intimated, however, that had
the jury found that Pembliton recklessly had thrown the stone, in light of
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss3/1
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would exist even if the result of the action was not what was
intended.71
Despite this divergent approach to mens rea, the concept of
evil motive-moral blameworthiness-as a prerequisite to
criminal responsibility was not abandoned in law. Rather, this
aspect of mens rea was preserved in doctrines of excuse. If con-
duct was intentional, but for reasons of duress, infancy or in-
sanity the defendant did not possess the capacity for moral
blameworthiness, a defense existed to the otherwise criminal
conduct.72
This mens rea duality was ultimately adopted by English
common law courts. In 1796 Blackstone explained that lunatics
suffered a deficiency in will that rendered them unable to tell
right from wrong.73 It is this lack of free will that prevents a
finding of criminal liability. According to Blackstone, it is a per-
son's free will and ability to choose to act that renders their con-
duct either "praiseworthy or culpable. 74
the nearness of the windows, he would have maliciously committed damage
under the statute.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
71. It is this theory of guilt that eventually took hold in the Model Penal Code
in the form of reckless involuntary manslaughter and in the felony-murder doc-
trine wherein the defendant is still held accountable for an unintentional killing
during the commission of inherently dangerous felony. See Gardner, supra note
45, at 682-84.
72. See PETER BRECHT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT, 41-42 (1963); Gard-
ner, supra note 45, at 695.
73. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24
(1769), cited with approval in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
74. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 20-21
(1769), quoted in Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out
of the Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 n.16 (2005). See also, Kathleen S.
Goddard, Case of Injustice? The Trial of John Bellingham, AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1
(Jan. 2004), wherein the author discusses that Hawkins and Blackstone did not
deal with insanity in detail. Hawkins took the view that a person must be able to
understand the law and be capable of conforming to it; a person of unsound mind
who could not distinguish between good and evil was therefore not culpable.
Blackstone also took the view that a lunatic could not be guilty of a crime in that
his understanding was defective, and therefore he lacked the necessary mental
element. Id.
The belief that a person must have moral culpability is further reflected in
death penalty jurisprudence. In 1986 the Court held that it is a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to execute a prisoner who is insane. Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). After reviewing the values as laid down by Blackstone
and Coke, Justice Marshall reasoned that:
13
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Perhaps the most famous English common law case is the
1843 M'Naughten's Case. In M'Naughten's Case, the English
court determined that while the prosecution held the burden of
establishing that the conduct of the defendant was intentional,
it was a defense if the defendant could prove that he or she did
not possess the mental state necessary to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his or her conduct. 75 According to the M'Naughten
test, the accused is not responsible for his or her conduct if, as a
result of mental illness, the accused did not know the nature
and quality of his actions or did not know that what he was
doing was wrong.76 Since its passage in 1843, the M'Naughten
test, or variations of it, has been utilized to determine the crimi-
nal responsibility, i.e., moral blameworthiness, of persons
whose mental illness deprived them of the ability to rationally
choose between right and wrong. 77 This dual approach to mens
rea thus preserved the historical requirement of moral blame-
worthiness, while at the same time it remedied the unpredict-
able results of a strict application of evil motive. 78
The various reasons put forth in support of the common-law restriction have
no less logical, moral, and practical force than they did when first voiced.
For today, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive
value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been
singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life. Similarly, the nat-
ural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to
come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the
intuition that such an execution simply offends humanity is evidently
shared across this Nation. Faced with such widespread evidence of a re-
striction upon sovereign power, this Court is compelled to conclude that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death
upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the condemned
from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dig-
nity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the
restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.
477 U.S. at 409-10 (internal citations omitted). And just this term, the Court held
such a prohibition applies even if the defendant is deemed competent to stand
trial. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2847-48 (2007).
75. McNaughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). McNaughten believed
that there was a conspiracy by the Prime Minister to kill him. However, in his
attempt to kill the Prime Minister, he actually killed the secretary to the Prime
Minister. McNaughten's defense was that he was suffering from persecutory delu-
sions at the time. Id. at 719.
76. Id. at 722.
77. Id. at 722-23.
78. Id. See also BRECHT, supra note 72, at 41-42; Gardner, supra note 45, at
468
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The duality of mens rea that is rooted in long standing com-
mon law was clearly adopted by the Supreme Court.7 9 It was
the absence of free will, which lies at the heart of criminal non-
responsibility of insane persons that was acknowledged by the
Court over 100 years ago:
[I]n order to constitute a crime, a person must have intelligence
and capacity enough to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if
his reason and mental powers are either so deficient that he has
no will, no conscience, or controlling mental power, or if, through
the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual
power is for the time obliterated, he is not a responsible moral
agent, and is not punishable for his criminal acts.... Neither in
the adjudged cases nor in the elementary treatises upon criminal
law is there to be found any dissent from these general proposi-
tions. All admit that the crime of murder necessarily involves the
possession by the accused of such mental capacity as will render
him criminally responsible for his acts.80
And more recently, the Court reflected in Morissette v.
United States, that
a relation between some mental element and punishment for a
harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar excul-
patory "But I didn't mean to".... Unqualified acceptance of this
doctrine by English common law . . . was indicated by Black-
stone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there
must first be a 'vicious will.' 8
Unfortunately, the attempts by several courts to address
the insanity issue have confused the dual nature of mens rea.
Rather than recognize the existence of two necessary but dis-
79. As Professor Stephen Morse points out, Justice Holmes observed that
"[e]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." Morse
& Hoffman, supra note 26, at 17 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COM-
MON LAW 3 (Dover Ed., 1991)).
80. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485 (1895) (internal citations omit-
ted). The Court noted in Davis that in a prosecution for murder, where the defense
is insanity, "and the fact of the killing with a deadly weapon [is] clearly estab-
lished," a defendant "is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon
all the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of com-
mitting [the] crime." Id. at 484.
81. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) (footnotes omit-
ted) (in prosecution under statute providing that whoever embezzles, steals, pur-
loins or knowingly converts government property is punishable by fine and
imprisonment, the mere fact that defendant's removal of property was a conscious
and intentional act did not give rise to presumption of criminal intent).
15
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tinct categories of mens rea, courts have tended to collapse the
two into a single notion of mens rea which focuses solely on the
mental element of a particular offense. By failing to under-
stand and give weight to the category of mens rea that ad-
dresses legal capacity for criminal responsibility, courts have
erroneously abandoned a deeply rooted principle of law that is
fundamental to our scheme of criminal justice.8 2
II. Constitutional Analysis of the Mens Rea Model by
State Courts.
The distinction between the affirmative defense of insanity
and the Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule "can be complex and
somewhat overlapping."8 3 This is particularly true as the term
'Mens Rea Model' is really a misnomer. To illustrate the differ-
ence the following hypothetical is frequently used: A is severely
mentally ill. If because of his mental illness, A kills B thinking
he is cutting a grapefruit, A is not guilty under either the af-
firmative defense of insanity or under the Mens Rea Model as A
did not intend to kill B.8 4 If, however, A shoots B, believing in
an acute state of mental illness that B is an enemy soldier and
that he must kill or be killed, evidence of mental illness would
be admissible under the affirmative defense doctrine, but would
not be an admissible defense under the Mens Rea Model.
Under an affirmative insanity defense, A's mental capacity
would be taken into account in assessing criminal liability.
Under the Mens Rea Model, however, because A knew B was a
human being and clearly intended to kill him, the elements of
the offense would be proven and a guilty verdict would follow.
82. In determining that evil motive remains central to the defenses of infancy,
insanity, duress and mistaken claim of right, Professor Gardner examined the the-
oretical status of these defenses and distinguished them from concepts relating to
mens rea requirements for prima facie guilt. Professor Gardner then concluded
that the failure to appreciate the offense/defense distinction can result in confusion
leading to two doctrinally undesirable manifestations: (1) restricted application or
outright rejection of the defenses; and (2) stifling of judicially created "new" de-
fenses. Gardner, supra note 45, at 737.
83. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 2742 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas,
8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 253, 261 (1999). See also State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359,
362 (Utah 1995).
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That the conduct was the result of A's mental illness and a be-
lief that B was an enemy soldier would be irrelevant.
Because the vast majority of mentally ill people are capable
of forming intent85 and most mental illness is not so extreme
that A believes he is cutting a grapefruit when in fact A is kill-
ing B, the Mens Rea Model effectively abolishes a person's abil-
ity to argue that he or she lacked the capacity for criminal
responsibility.8 6 Despite such harsh results, the Mens Rea
Model has withstood constitutional challenges in four of the five
states that have adopted it.87
While the five courts to consider the Mens Rea Model agree
that mens rea is constitutionally required,8 the courts are in
disagreement over exactly what the mens rea concept itself re-
quires.8 9 Much of the confusion is the result of the courts' fail-
ure to appreciate in any meaningful manner the duality of mens
rea. Despite the clear historical mandate that mens rea re-
quires not just intent, but moral blameworthiness, courts mis-
understand the duality of mens rea and simply conclude that
the Mens Rea Model is constitutional.
This confusion resulted in four state supreme courts up-
holding the Mens Rea Model as constitutional. In finding that
the Mens Rea Model was consistent with constitutional due pro-
cess, these four courts relied on essentially three arguments: 1)
the Due Process Clause does not bind the states to any one test
for insanity; 2) the Mens Rea Model still requires the existence
of mens rea; and 3) the Mens Rea Model is in keeping with the
medical field.90
The most prevalent argument offered by the state courts is
that a test for insanity has not been constitutionally mandated.
85. Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 40-41 (1984) ("Craziness seems to affect impulses, con-
trols, and motivations for actions, but it does not stop persons from intending to do
what they do or from narrowly knowing factually what they are doing.").
86. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 26, at 20-21. See also, Rosen, supra note 84.
87. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 917 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d
840, 844 (Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 999 (Mont. 1984); Herrera, 895
P.2d at 364. Only the Nevada Supreme Court has found the mens rea model a
violation of due process. Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 844; Korell, 690 P.2d at 999;
Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364.
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First, the state courts pointed to the longstanding precedent
that defining criminal conduct and defenses is within the sole
province of the state. Relying on Powell v. Texas,91 the state
courts concluded that they are free to limit mental illness evi-
dence for the purposes of refuting the elements of the crime
charged. 92 In Powell, the Supreme Court upheld the state's
right to criminalize and punish public drunkenness. Writing
for the plurality, Justice Marshall found that the shifting moral
views of society gave the states the right to adjust their laws
accordingly.93
Second, and more specifically, the state courts relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Leland v. Oregon94 wherein the
Court declined to adopt any specific insanity test as required by
the Due Process Clause. 95 In Leland, the Supreme Court up-
held an Oregon statute that placed the burden of proving in-
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the defendant. 96 The
Supreme Court, in refusing to adopt a specific test for insanity,
determined a specific test would be unwarranted given the un-
certainty in the psychiatric community and the erratic history
of the insanity defense. 97 Consequently, the state courts at is-
sue assumed that Leland established that no constitutional due
process right exists as to any particular insanity test.98
91. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
92. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 844; Korell, 690 P.2d at 999;
Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364.
93. Powell, 392 U.S. at 536. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity,
mistake, justification and duress have historically provided the tools for a con-
stantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the crimi-
nal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical and medical views of the
nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the prov-
ince of the States.
94. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (adoption of the irresistible impulse
test is not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty).
95. Id. at 798-99.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 800.
98. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 917 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d
840, 844 (Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 999 (Mont. 1984); State v.
Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 364 (Utah 1995). It is the failure to of the Supreme Court
to positively state that an affirmative defense of insanity is constitutionally man-
dated that led Professors Morse and Hoffman to conclude that a state may consti-
tutionally abolish all forms of an insanity defense. Morse & Hoffman, supra note
26, at 58.
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Based on the premise that no particular insanity test is re-
quired, the state courts used Leland and Powell as springboards
to label the Mens Rea Model as simply another variant of the
insanity defense. By claiming that the Mens Rea Model does
not altogether abolish a defendant's ability to claim insanity, in
that a defendant could still argue to the jury that as a result of a
mental disease or defect he did not possess the requisite mental
element of the offense, state courts concluded the Mens Rea
Model did not offend the Due Process Clause. 99 Implicit in these
decisions is a failure to recognize that legal capacity as a pre-
condition for criminal responsibility is a necessary part of mens
rea.100
Finally, the state courts parsed out the language of several
Supreme Court decisions that discuss the history and debate in
the psychiatric community over the definitions of insanity and
mental illnesses. Again, relying on the failure to adopt a spe-
cific test in Leland, the state courts focused on "the uncertainty
in the psychiatric community" and the "erratic history of the
insanity defense." 10 1 To buttress the claim, the courts often
cited to the now familiar passage in Powell that the
doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification,
and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly
shifting adjustment of the tension between evolving aims of the
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and
medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment
has always been thought to be the province of the States.10 2
99. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 844; Korell, 690 P.2d at 999;
Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364.
100. See Korell, 690 P.2d at 999 ("We reject appellant's contention that from
the earliest period of the common law, insanity has been recognized as a defense.
What we recognize is that one who lacks the requisite criminal state of mind may
not be convicted or punished."). What the court in Korrell failed to acknowledge is
that simply because the standard for legal insanity has evolved over time does not
equate to the lack of firmly rooted principles that some form of affirmative insanity
defense be provided.
101. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364. Again, the courts seem to simply accept that
because psychiatry and medical standard have evolved, the affirmative defense is
not constitutionally required.
102. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 918 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968));
Korell, 690 P.2d at 999 (citing Powell, 392 U.S. 514); Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364
(citing Powell, 392 U.S. 514). See generally Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kansas court
adopts the Powell analysis).
473
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Emphasizing that the Powell Court held that casting a par-
ticular test would "freeze the developing productive dialogue be-
tween law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold," the
state courts concluded that the Mens Rea Model better fit with
the psychiatric view. 10 3
While one reason for the conflation of the two categories of
mens rea is the failure of the Supreme Court to set out a com-
plete definition of mens rea, the state courts are mistaken in
assuming that states' authority to define crimes and defenses,
and the marshaling of evidence in criminal trials, is unlimited.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has held very loose
reins on the states' passage and application of their statutes, 10 4
state law must still comport with the Constitution. 10 5 Justice
Kennedy, in his dissent in Clark v. Arizona 10 6 explained that
the Court, as the final arbiter of the Constitution, still retains
some control over state laws:
States have substantial latitude under the Constitution to define
rules for the exclusion of evidence and to apply those rules to
criminal defendants. This authority, however, has constitutional
limits. Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confron-
tation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guaran-
tees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense. This right is abridged by evidence rules that
infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary
or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. 10 7
Second, the state courts' focus on Powell's concern that any
given test would "freeze the mold" is antithetical. The basis for
the current tension between psychiatric diagnosis and insanity
is the need to take psychiatric tests and classify them by a legal
103. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364 (citing Powell, 392 U.S. 514). See generally
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 918; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 851-52.
104. See generally Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
105. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 330-31 (2006) (holding that
a defendant has the right to present evidence of third party guilt as a defense);
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (stating that a defendant has the
right to present evidence that his confession, ruled admissible for Fifth Amend-
ment purposes, is unreliable); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (hold-
ing that a state court must not apply hearsay rules in a manner that deprives a
defendant of the ability to present his defense).
106. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 2738 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2743 (citations omitted).
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standard that is not concerned with psychology, but with the
accused's mental capacity. Such tension is not the result of the
insanity defense. In fact, it is just the opposite. An affirmative
defense of insanity does not stop the evolution or dialogue be-
tween the law and psychiatry, but enhances and encourages
further development. As the psychiatric community evolves
and changes so will the presentation of evidence to the trier of
fact. It is the complete abolition of the defense that prevents
the introduction and evolution of mental illness and criminal
responsibility. Thus, for the schizophrenic who believes that his
next door neighbor is an enemy soldier or for the person who
suffers from Alzheimer's and does not remember what he did or
why, the punishment is equal to that of the person who, with
full understanding of their conduct, made a conscious decision
to break the law.108 By failing to understand the relationship
between moral blameworthiness and mens rea the state courts
have dismissed as "erratic history" the centuries-old principle of
criminal responsibility, which evolved from ancient Judeo-
Christian and Anglo-Saxon moral and ethical concepts. 10 9
Nevada, the only state to hold the Mens Rea Model uncon-
stitutional, did not dismiss the history of mens rea, it just did
not fully appreciate, and therefore clearly articulate, the duality
108. An example of the injustice of the Utah statute was set out by Judge
Stewart's dissenting opinion in Herrera. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 381 n.20 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Judge John M. Wajert, 51, stepped down from the bench after eight
years as a Pennsylvania judge. Two years later, he was arrested for embezzling
$125,000 from clients. It was found that the former judge was suffering from
Alzheimer's. He wore rumpled clothes, and he no longer shaved. During the
seven-day trial, he slumped in a chair and stared vacantly at the floor. His defense
counsel claimed that Wajert was unable to assist in his own defense, that
Alzheimer's so impaired his client that the only thing the former judge could un-
derstand was that he needed money and so he took it, and that he was not able to
exercise any kind of rational judgment. Wajert did not know of his degenerated
condition, although his wife said: "He has been told repeatedly (about his afflic-
tion), and he doesn't remember. Why he said just the other day 'What do you sup-
pose is the matter with me?"' A Mind Undermined, When Did a Chesco Judge
Accused of Embezzlement Become Ill?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 4, 1983, at
BOL. Because the judge knew that he was taking money, that knowledge was suffi-
cient under Utah law to convict him of a crime, even though he lacked the mental
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his acts. His uninhibited
urge to take the money was not unlike that of a child who grabs candy at the store
without paying. Id.
109. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 364.
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of the concept. 110 The Nevada Supreme Court in Finger aptly
noted that for hundreds of years society has recognized that
mentally ill individuals may be incapable of understanding the
consequences of their conduct, and that when their conduct vio-
lated a legal or moral standard, those persons were institution-
alized rather than sent to penal institutions." 1 While the
Finger court acknowledged Leland and Powell and the signifi-
cant debate over the definition of legal insanity, Finger ulti-
mately determined that the debate only highlighted the right of
the states to determine the details of how to implement a legal
insanity defense, not that the defense could be abolished.112
Once Finger concluded that the Supreme Court did not opt
for the abolition of insanity, it determined the insanity defense
was so rooted in our notions of justice as to be a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution. 113 By holding that criminal
responsibility has historically been tied to an understanding of
right and wrong, the Finger court reasoned that the Mens Rea
Model made the fatal assumption that crimes simply require
the intent to act and ignored that most crimes also require an
110. Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
111. Id. at 71. Specifically, the court stated:
For hundreds of years, societies recognized that insane individuals are inca-
pable of understanding when their conduct violates a legal or moral stan-
dard, and they were therefore relieved of criminal liability for their actions.
Such individuals did not escape responsibility for their actions; they were
still locked away, but in asylums, not prisons .... This concept of treating
individuals differently based upon their mental capacity is called legal in-
sanity. It recognizes that a 'crime' involves something more than just the
commission of a particular act, it also involves a certain mental component.
This mental component is usually referred to as the mens rea of a crime, or
criminal intent. The term 'mens rea' refers to the mental state of a person at
the time of the commission of the criminal act.
Id.
112. Id. at 81-82 (When read in context, the comments in Powell support the
Supreme Court's longstanding policy to generally permit the states to determine
the details of how to implement well-established doctrines. In other words, how a
state chooses to present the issue of legal insanity is left up to state law. Powell
cannot be read to stand for the proposition that the concept of legal insanity, i.e. an
inability to form the requisite mens rea, is not a fundamental principle of our juris-
prudence entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.).
113. Id. at 80 (historical practice overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that
legal insanity is a fundamental principle).
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element of knowledge or willfulness. 114 In the end the Finger
court held that legal insanity is a necessary corollary to mens
rea and that as the legal defense of insanity consists of a con-
scious knowledge of right and wrong, its abolition contravened
the requirement of mens rea.115
The court in Finger failed to grasp the duality of mens rea.
The focus of the Finger court was that, in addition to intent, it
was constitutionally required that the defendant know the con-
sequences of his or her conduct or understand the difference be-
tween right and wrong. 11 6 This analysis, however, did nothing
more than reaffirm the M'Naughten test, thereby defeating any
precedential value of the opinion. By failing to clearly acknowl-
edge that legal capacity for criminal responsibility is a compo-
nent of mens rea external to offense elements, the Finger court
missed an opportunity to fully consider the due process implica-
tions of abolishing the insanity defense. 117
114. Id. at 79 (the State's assertion that knowledge that one's actions are
"wrong" is not generally an element of a crime, even a specific intent crime, and it
is not a requirement of murder; therefore, the State's argument must fail).
115. Id. at 81. See also supra, note 111.
116. Finger, 27 F.3d at 84. Ultimately, the court in Finger held:
Historically, the mens rea of most crimes, particularly specific intent crimes,
incorporates some element of wrongfulness as that term is used in Lewis
and M'Naughten. The Legislature can only eliminate this concept of wrong-
fulness if it redefines the crime itself, in other words, if it chooses to make
the act, regardless of the mental state, the crime. Thus murder could simply
be defined as the killing of a human being. But so long as a crime requires
some additional mental intent, then legal insanity must be a complete de-
fense to that crime.
Id.
117. A close examination cf State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 844 (Kan. 2003), dem-
onstrates that while the Kansas Supreme Court was presented with the duality of
mens rea it was not forced to address it. Despite Mr. Bethel's heavy reliance on
the decision in Finger, the Kansas court dismissed the analysis and merely reiter-
ated that mens rea is embodied within the elements of the crime. Noting that
malice is not an element of the offense of murder, as it is in Nevada, the Kansas
court held that the analysis in Finger was inapplicable. Had the Finger court
clearly articulated the distinction between positive and negative mens rea, rather
than simply rehashing the fairness of M'Naughten, the Kansas court would have
been faced with a much different proposition.
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III. Constitutional Analysis of Insanity by the United States
Supreme Court: Clark v. Arizona
Not only did the Finger court miss the opportunity to clar-
ify and define the debate as to mens rea and insanity, but so too
did the Supreme Court in Clark v. Arizona.118 Despite being
given the opportunity to resolve the debate over the constitu-
tionality of the insanity defense, the Court declined to do so and
chose to resolve the case by conducting an unnecessarily compli-
cated analysis of moral capacity and the use of evidence. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has yet to provide a definitive
answer to the question of whether a state court can abolish in-
sanity as an extrinsic, affirmative defense to the crime charged.
Even though the Court in Clark failed to provide the hoped
for resolution to the debate, the opinions of Justices Souter and
Kennedy do provide insight into the Court's predispositions on
the issue. What could be termed the boldest statement issued
by the Court on this question is found in footnote 20 of the
Clark opinion: "[W]e have never held that the Constitution
mandates an insanity defense, nor have we held that the Consti-
tution does not so require. This case does not call upon us to
decide the matter."1 9
While it is true that the Court reiterated that it has never
held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, the
Court also seems manifestly unwilling to hold the opposite.
A thorough analysis of what the Court did decide in Clark
is not necessary for the purpose of this article. However, leav-
ing aside the quibbling over which issue was ripe for review and
the categorizing of evidentiary standards that consume much of
the Court's attention in Clark, the opinions in the case suggest
that an extrinsic insanity defense, in some form, is required by
the Due Process Clause. Not only does the majority opinion im-
plicitly find that moral blameworthiness is essential to criminal
118. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (2006).
119. Id. at 2722 n.20 (emphasis added). This statement was stated in con-
junction with the majority's citation to the four states that abolished the affirma-
tive defense of insanity and replaced it with the Mens Rea Model. One could
legitimately argue that, had the majority believed, as do those four states, that an
affirmative defense of insanity is not constitutionally required, the statement
would have been unnecessary.
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responsibility, 120 but Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, expressly
states that the category of mens rea which addresses only the
offense elements is separate and distinct from the extrinsic is-
sue of insanity. According to Justice Kennedy, to properly ana-
lyze the issues of elements mens rea and insanity, courts must
understand that each concept addresses very distinct legal
questions and that if the two concepts are melded, unworkable
and unconstitutional standards are created.121
At issue in Clark was the standard for insanity adopted in
Arizona and how mental illness evidence could be used by a de-
fendant. Prior to 1993, Arizona utilized the M'Naughten test
for insanity. 22 If the accused did not understand the nature
and consequences of his conduct or if the accused did not under-
stand the conduct to be wrong, the accused was not criminally
liable. 23 In 1993 the Arizona legislature eliminated the ques-
tion of cognitive incapacity, 24 or the first prong of M'Naughten,
and limited the insanity defense to a question of moral incapac-
ity-did the accused know the conduct was wrong.125 Addition-
ally, under State v. Mott, 26 evidence of mental disease or defect
could only be used to establish the affirmative defense of in-
sanity; it could not be used to negate the specific intent ele-
ments of the crime charged. Clark challenged the limiting of
insanity to a question of moral incapacity as well as the prohibi-
tion of evidence of mental disease or defect to negate intent as
violations of the Due Process Clause.
While the Court ultimately concluded that the Due Process
Clause was not violated, the discussion surrounding the holding
offers some insight into the leanings of the Court. Justice Sou-
120. See generally Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2722 (wherein the majority discusses
that moral and cognitive capacity evidence is intertwined to the extent that Clark
fails to establish that Arizona law violates due process).
121. Id. at 2747. See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) ("the
existence or non-existence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the
existence or non-existence of the required mental elements of the crime").
122. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2719.
123. Id.
124. See Id. at 2722 n.7. The Court defines "capacity" as "the ability to form a
certain state of mind or motive, understand or evaluate one's actions, or control
them." Id.
125. ARiz REV. STAT. §13-502(A) (2007).
126. State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1234 (1997).
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ter, writing for the majority, accepted that the appropriate stan-
dard by which to measure a due process violation is whether the
Arizona statute "offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun-
damental."127 In upholding Arizona's abandonment of cognitive
capacity as a part of the affirmative defense of insanity, the
Court did not state that an affirmative defense of insanity is not
constitutionally required. Justice Souter simply accepted the
idea that extrinsic evidence of the lack of criminal responsibility
was a necessary part of due process, and concluded that in de-
termining moral blameworthiness, evidence of capacity is nec-
essarily evaluated. According to the Court:
[C]ognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral inca-
pacity.... As a defendant can therefore make out moral incapac-
ity by demonstrating cognitive incapacity, evidence bearing on
whether the defendant knew the nature and quality of his actions
is both relevant and admissible. 128
Since evidence going to both cognitive and moral capacity was
admissible under Arizona law, the Court held that the statute
did not contravene the Due Process Clause. Although the deci-
sion is not dispositive of the issue, it is a significant indicator
that the legal capacity for general criminal responsibility, or
blameworthiness is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ' 29
The larger issue in Clark was whether evidence of incapac-
ity could be excluded to negate the elements of the offense. In
upholding the Mott rule, that evidence of insanity can only be
used to establish the affirmative defense of insanity and not to
negate the elements of the offense, the majority looked to two
main presumptions in any criminal trial: the presumption of in-
127. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2719 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977)). It is significant that the Court adopted the rule of Patterson, which is
traditionally applied to questions of procedural due process to the question at is-
sue, which is thought to be one of substantive due process. See also, Morse & Hoff-
man, supra note 26, at 9 (citing Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll,
and the Due Process of Proof, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 193-96).
128. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2722.
129. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202 (despite power of the states to regulate proce-
dures under which its laws are carried, laws must comport with due process).
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nocence and the presumption of sanity.130 In finding Mott con-
stitutional, the Court created a tripartite structure, breaking
down insanity evidence into observation evidence, which is typi-
cally presented by lay testimony, and mental disease evidence
and mental capacity evidence, both of which are typically
presented through expert testimony. 131 After concluding that
observation evidence is always admissible to negate offense ele-
ments, the majority held that Arizona was justified in funneling
mental disease and capacity evidence, or expert testimony,
through an affirmative insanity defense. 32
While the discussion of the breakdown of evidence that can
be used to rebut the presumption of sanity versus the negation
of offense elements has been heavily criticized, 133 there is no
disagreement that based on such a presumption, an accused
must be sane to be criminally culpable. Moreover, what the ma-
jority opinion implicitly recognizes is that the presumption of
sanity is best rebutted by an affirmative defense of insanity
through the use of mental disease and capacity evidence. 34
Even the dissent in Clark implies that mental disease and
capacity evidence should be addressed by an affirmative de-
fense of insanity. 35 What Justice Kennedy takes issue with is
the majority's tripartite classification of evidence and its hold-
130. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2729-30 (whether state regulation of evidence violates
the Fourteenth Amendment turns on the application of the presumption of inno-
cence and the presumption of sanity).
131. Id. at 2724-25.
132. See Id. at 2732 (During the discussion of the three types of evidence, the
Court found that Arizona is justified in channeling mental disease and capacity
evidence through an affirmative insanity defense. During this discussion, the
Court implied that an affirmative defense is the best way to present the evidence.).
133. See generally Clark, 126 S.Ct. 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Peter Wes-
ten, The Supreme Court's Bout with Insanity: Clark v. Arizona, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRLM.
L. 143 (2006).
134. See Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2730 n.38 (The Court rejected the State's argu-
ment that mens rea and insanity are distinguishable and evidence of one is not
relevant to the other. Specifically, the Court stated that "not only does evidence
accepted as showing insanity trump mens rea, but evidence of behavior close to the
time of the act charged may indicate both the actual state of mind at that time and
also an enduring incapacity to form the criminal state of mind necessary to the
offense charged.").
135. Id. at 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (while Justice Kennedy finds it un-
necessary to address whether the Arizona test violates due process, he clearly de-
lineates between offense elements and an affirmative defense and strongly
advocates for the admission of expert testimony).
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ing that only observation evidence can be used to negate the
offense elements. 136 Justice Kennedy reasoned that expert tes-
timony is essential to lending credibility to observation evidence
and the factual determination of whether the offense elements
are met. 1
37
In rejecting the majority's classification of evidence, Justice
Kennedy highlighted the most important issue, and the one
that the majority failed to recognize: that by "conflating the in-
sanity defense and the question of intent," confusion over mens
rea is created. 138 Justice Kennedy understood the intent to com-
mit the crime as a mens rea element of the offense, and the ca-
pacity for criminal responsibility, are separate legal concepts.
[Mental illness] evidence addresses different issues in the two in-
stances. Criminal responsibility involves an inquiry into whether
the defendant knew right from wrong, not whether he had the
mens rea elements of the offense. While there may be overlap be-
tween the two issues, "the existence or nonexistence of legal in-
sanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or
nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime.' 39
In light of the trend among states to reevaluate their in-
sanity statutes, the failure of the Clark majority to acknowledge
the distinction between two distinct categories of mens rea-
one relating to the required mental state as an element of an
offense, and the other relating to the capacity for criminal re-
sponsibility-is unfortunate. After Clark, the lack of a worka-
ble standard will undoubtedly lead to increased litigation as the
issue percolates though the state courts. Eventually, the Court
again will be asked to reexamine the issue of insanity, at which
time it will be necessary for the Court to resolve the duality of
mens rea and the constitutionality of the Mens Rea Model.
136. Id. at 2738-39 (finding the evidentiary framework adopted will be un-
workable and that the test was especially inappropriate in this case as the mental
disease evidence was so intertwined with the observation evidence as to lend it the
needed credibility).
137. Id. at 2739 ("The psychiatrist's explanation of Clark's condition was es-
sential to understanding how he processes sensory data and therefore to deciding
what information was in his mind at the time of the shooting. Simply put, knowl-
edge relies on cognition, and cognition can be affected by schizophrenia.").
138. Id. at 2746.
139. Id. at 2747 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 412 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring)).
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IV. Due Process and the Duality of Mens Rea
Having established that capacity for criminal responsibil-
ity, or moral blameworthiness, is a part of mens rea which is
deeply rooted in our system of justice, the question becomes
whether the Mens Rea Model violates due process by eliminat-
ing an essential category of mens rea. The preceding analyses
of both state court opinions and the Supreme Court's decision in
Clark demonstrate that the courts have failed to bring any
meaningful dialogue to the debate. By failing to acknowledge
the duality of mens rea, the opinions are of little analytical
value. What remains, then, is to analyze the constitutionality
of the Mens Rea Model utilizing the proper understanding of
mens rea and the affirmative defense of insanity.
The concept of mens rea is rooted in the notion of human
free will, which has always been the "chief paradigm" of our
criminal law. 140 In other words, individuals are assumed to be
autonomous, rational beings who are possessed with a mini-
mum ability to choose whether to violate or abide by the law's
140. PACKER, supra note 39. There are those, primarily in the psychiatric and
behavioral science communities, who subscribe to the view-known as the "beha-
viorist" position-that there is no such thing as free will because all human behav-
ior is determined by forces which the individual is powerless to change. Therefore,
any notion of moral "blameworthiness" for acts considered by law to be criminal is
illusory and, as a product of an outdated emphasis on retribution as punishment
for past evil acts, should be abandoned. Instead, the behaviorists argue, criminal
law should focus, not on assessing blame for past conduct or on the nature of the
offense, but on modifying behavior through treatment, or on confinement, to pre-
vent the commission of such acts in the future. See id. at 12-15 (discussing beha-
viorist position). As Packer notes, because the insanity defense represents a
crystallization of the notion of criminal responsibility which "universally charac-
terizes the criminal law," and which the behaviorists flatly reject, the behaviorist
position is that the insanity defense should be abolished. Id. at 15. The behavior-
ist position in its most pure form would discard mens rea altogether from the defi-
nition of legal accountability, in essence reducing all crimes to strict liability. See
BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE
AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 51-57 (2d ed. 1981) (1963). However, "[u]nless one wishes
the law to stop treating persons as persons-as beings deserving of praise and
blame-and wishes the law, instead, to treat them as machines that need only be
adjusted, criticism of the law's assessment of mental states is misguided." Stephen
J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777, 801 (1985).
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dictates, and are therefore blameworthy and fully responsible
for making the wrong choice.' 4 '
The Mens Rea Model claims consistency with the principle
of mens rea, even though it admits to abolishing the insanity
defense and replacing it with an evidentiary rule relating only
to the mental element of a particular offense. Historically,
early proponents of the Mens Rea Model argued that an in-
sanity acquittal was tantamount to a finding that the defendant
lacked the purpose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence req-
uisite to conviction, and thus lacked the mens rea of the crime.
The result, these proponents argued, is that the defendant must
be discharged because he is not guilty, rather than indefinitely
committed to a mental institution because he is insane. 142
141. Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility
Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 859 (1977).
142. Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"- Why Not?,
72 YALE L.J. 853, 863-68 (1963); Norval Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous
Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 519 (1968).
It seems to be no coincidence that initial proposals to abolish the insanity de-
fense coincided with the 1960s movement to de-institutionalize the mentally ill.
See generally Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Home-
lessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 80-108 (1991) (discuss-
ing history and consequences of deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill). Of
particular concern to these abolitionists was the belief that the insanity defense
was little more than a cruel device to indefinitely restrain the mentally ill in state
mental hospitals, "mega-asylums" where treatment was inadequate, and which, by
linking insanity and violence, stigmatized the mentally ill. See Morris, supra note
142, at 521-23.
But, whatever the historical merit of deinstitutionalization, and whatever in-
sufficiencies exist in providing institutionalized treatment for mentally ill persons
in the context of the insanity defense, it is common knowledge that today
America's prisons are filled to the brim with mentally ill persons who are receiving
little treatment, if any at all. See Report of Human Rights Watch, Ill Equipped:
U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness (2003), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usalOO3/ (noting that the current, and growing, num-
ber of mentally ill persons incarcerated in the United States is, in part, an unin-
tended consequence of the failure to provide adequate support, funding and
direction for community mental health services that were supposed to replace the
mental hospitals shut down as part of the deinstitutionalization effort of the
1960s); Daniel J. Nusbaum, Note, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical
Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of "Abolishing" the Insanity Defense, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1509, 1565 (2002).
It has become relatively clear that since the mid-1970s, the emphasis on
rehabilitation as a central purpose of punishment has fallen into strong dis-
favor, and has been almost completely replaced by a focus upon retribu-
tion .... And while most prisons usually have some treatment programs
available to offenders, it can hardly be gainsaid that the focus of prisons in
484
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Later proponents took a less benevolent approach, and pushed
for abolition of the insanity defense, in part as a matter of "pub-
lic safety" in the wake of John Hinckley's insanity acquittal fol-
lowing his attempted assassination of President Reagan. 143
They, like the earlier proponents, treated the concept of mens
rea as synonymous with the mental state required as an ele-
ment of a particular crime, and argued that abolishing the in-
sanity defense and replacing it with the Mens Rea Model
evidentiary rule would alleviate alleged jury confusion in deal-
ing with instructions on a separate insanity defense. 44 But
these arguments expose a fundamental conceptual flaw in the
Mens Rea Model, which violates due process and thus renders it
unconstitutional. By confusing two different categories of mens
rea, the Mens Rea Model completely eliminates that category of
mens rea which addresses general criminal responsibility, not
at the offense level through elements of the crime, but at the
defense level through the affirmative defense of insanity. 145
Many scholars have noted that the question of insanity is
not intrinsic to the mental element required by the definition of
a criminal offense. 146 While most crimes do define a particular
mens rea element, this is only one category of mens rea, re-
ferred to as "positive," or "special," mens rea, which is primarily
concerned with offense grading. 147 The other category of mens
today's society is not on treatment. Therefore, to assert that a mentally ill
individual is more likely to receive treatment in a state prison than he
would if placed in a state mental health institution, which exists for the very
purpose of treatment, is not even minutely logical.
Id.
143. See Morse, supra note 140, at 779; Raymond L. Spring, Farewell to In-
sanity: A Return to Mens Rea, 66 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 38, 43 (1997). If "public safety"
from insanity acquittals was a primary moving force for these abolitionists, it sug-
gests that they were more interested in increasing criminal convictions of the men-
tally ill, rather than legal clarity. See George M. Platt, The Proposal to Abolish the
Federal Insanity Defense: A Critique, 10 CAL. W. L. REV. 449, 470 (1974) (noting
the proposal to abolish the federal insanity defense was made during Nixon's "law
and order" administration, and "[ilf the motivation for abolition of the defense is to
achieve greater conviction rates by stripping from unbalanced defendants the op-
portunity to prove themselves not guilty by reason of insanity, the proposal can
only be described as odious.").
144. Platt, supra note 143, at 452; Spring, supra note 143, at 45.
145. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2729 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. PACKER, supra note 39, at 103-08; Morse, supra note 84, at 8; Gardner,
supra note 45, at 654-67.
147. PACKER, supra note 39, at 105.
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rea is legal capacity, termed "negative" or "general" mens rea,
which is a precondition for criminal liability, quite apart from
the elements of the crime. 148 Since general mens rea is con-
cerned with legal capacity for criminal responsibility, or "blame-
worthiness," it is not an element of a crime that the prosecution
must prove, but rather is addressed through the doctrine of
excuses.149
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this mens rea du-
ality when it held in Leland v. Oregon 50 that it was constitu-
tionally permissible to require the defendant to prove that he
did not have the capacity to be criminally responsible for his
acts. The defendant in Leland argued that requiring him to
prove insanity violated due process because it required him to
disprove the elements of the crime.' 5 ' In rejecting the defen-
dant's argument, the Court in Leland clearly acknowledged the
148. Id. at 106-07. See also State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 922-35 (Idaho 1990)
(McDevitt, J., dissenting) (pointing out this distinction, and concluding that the
insanity defense is required by due process); BLACKSTONE, supra note 74 (discuss-
ing Blackstone's position that "lunatics" cannot be held criminally liable).
149. See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 26, at 8.
Courts and commentators consistently fall prey to confusing "special" mens
rea, the specific mental state element that is part of the definition of the
crime and thus part of the prosecution's prima facie case, and "general"
mens rea, a generic term for lack of responsibility that might be produced in
whole or in part by factors such as legal insanity, duress, or partial responsi-
bility .... A defendant who lacks special mens rea is acquitted because his
conduct fails to satisfy the state's definition of the offense, not because he
lacks responsibility. The conduct of a defendant who lacks general mens rea
almost always satisfies the elements of the prima facie case including spe-
cial mens rea, but he is acquitted because he is not considered responsible
for his conduct.
Id. See also PACKER, supra note 39, at 112 ("[Tlhe case for excuses in the criminal
law rests most securely on claims for the protection of human autonomy that quite
transcend the calculus of crime prevention."); Stephen Morse, Rationality and Re-
sponsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 258 (2000) ("[Tlhe general capacity for ration-
ality is the precondition for liberty and autonomy. A lack of this capacity explains
virtually all cases of criminal law excuses and virtually all the mental health laws
that treat some people with mental disorders differently from people without disor-
ders."). As Professor Gardner has pointed out, "at the defense level, the evil motive
concept provides vital doctrinal footing for theories of excuse that protect against
unfair punishment." Gardner, supra note 45, at 640-41.
150. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). See also Clark, 126 S.Ct. 2709
(rather than simply finding the affirmative defense of insanity is not constitution-
ally required, the Court construed the state law in a manner that enabled it to
conclude that the statute was constitutional).
151. Leland, 343 U.S. at 793.
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distinction between the question of guilt or innocence as to the
elements of the crime and the question of general criminal re-
sponsibility.152 The Court recognized that there is a difference
between evidence that creates a reasonable doubt about the
state's proof of offense elements, and evidence that establishes
the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility. 153 Indeed, in
this context, if there is no evidence that the defendant suffers
from a mental abnormality, the defendant's general mens rea is
not in question, whether or not the elements of the crime can be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, if there is evi-
dence of a mental abnormality, such evidence may negate gen-
eral mens rea even if it does not create reasonable doubt on the
elements of the crime. 54
Since insanity is addressed in that category of mens rea re-
lating to legal capacity for criminal responsibility, an insane de-
fendant is not criminally responsible, regardless of whether the
elements of the offense are otherwise met. In other words, in-
sanity excuses a person from criminal responsibility, not be-
cause he did not commit the act in question, but because his
general mental condition robbed him of his free will, rendering
him incapable of making a meaningful choice when he acted.155
152. This appears to be the same idea the Supreme Court of Nevada was get-
ting at in Finger v. State. Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 79-85 (Nev. 2001) (analyzing
the issue of criminal responsibility as a person's legal capacity to appreciate the
"wrongfulness" of his or her actions, which can only be addressed by an affirmative
insanity defense). The court in Finger stated:
Evidence that does not rise to the level of legal insanity may, of course, be
considered in evaluating whether or not the prosecution has proven each
element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, for example in determin-
ing whether a killing is first or second-degree murder or manslaughter or
some other argument regarding diminished capacity.
Id. at 85.
153. Leland, 343 U.S. at 802-07 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
154. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234 (1987).
Evidence creating a reasonable doubt could easily fall far short of proving
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Of course, if such doubt is
not raised in the jury's mind and each juror is convinced that the defendant
purposely and with prior calculation and design took life, the killing will
still be excused if the elements of the defense are satisfactorily established.
Id. Both Leland and Martin refute the very argument put forward by the propo-
nents of the Mens Rea Model to justify abolition of the insanity defense.
155. In this sense, "free will" does not equate with psychiatric determinism, as
the behaviorists would assert. See PACKER, supra note 39, at 12. As Professor
Morse argues, in a causal universe it makes no sense to say that the lack of free
33
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The Mens Rea Model simply casts aside this fundamental cate-
gory of mens rea, and by doing so turns a basic, founding princi-
ple of our criminal justice system on its head: under the Mens
Rea Model, an insane person-one who was irrational and com-
pelled by his mental abnormality to act; in short, one who is
deprived of his or her free will-is held criminally responsible
for that act. 156
The constitutional infirmity of the Mens Rea Model be-
comes even clearer when the doctrine of diminished capacity is
examined. By limiting evidence of mental impairment to that
which negates the mental element of a particular offense, the
Mens Rea Model substitutes the insanity defense with what is
known as the "mens rea variant"157 or "mens rea model" 58 of
will means that the person's behavior is "uncaused." Morse, supra note 140, at 789
n.31. But, "[i]f free will means that the person is not compelled, then it is a reason-
able synonym for one criterion of responsibility-as long as compulsion is not sim-
ply the equivalent of 'caused."' Id. (citing H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF
CRIMINAL INSANITY 71-81 (1972)). Morse states elsewhere that "free will," if un-
packed, "collapses into a theory about rationality and hard choice." Morse, supra
note 149, at 258. It is the general capacity for rationality, and the absence of com-
pulsion, that are the conditions of responsibility. Id. at 256-58.
156. See PACKER, supra note 39, at 132 ("We must put up with the bother of
the insanity defense because to exclude it is to deprive the criminal law of its chief
paradigm of free will."). Professor Packer states: "We excuse a man who does not
understand not because he does not understand but because his lack of under-
standing renders him incapable of making a meaningful choice. Cognition is not
the complement of volition; it is its precursor." Id. at 134. Professor Morse puts it
in a slightly different way, but the principle is the same:
Actors, such as small children, who lack reasonable cognitive or volitional
capacity through no fault of their own may be dangerous, but are not consid-
ered fully responsible as moral agents. This basic intuition about the way
cognitive and volitional capacity relate to responsibility is tracked by the
insanity defense tests, which all focus on the actor's irrationality (e.g., lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions) and/or lack
of self-control (e.g., lacks substantial capacity to conform his actions to the
requirements of law).
Morse, supra note 85, at 20-21. Morse makes an important point here. It is not
the purpose of this article to get into a discussion of various insanity tests, and
Morse shows why they are not important to the discussion. The well-documented
confusion over legal tests and definitions of insanity does not deter from the cen-
tral underpinning of our understanding of insanity: if an actor is irrational and
not in control of his actions because of mental illness, he is not blameworthy, in
both the moral and legal sense. It is this core notion of blameworthiness to which
the Supreme Court referred in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485 (1895).
See supra, text at note 80.
157. See Morse, supra note 85.
158. Arenella, supra note 141.
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diminished capacity doctrine. Proponents of the Mens Rea
Model as a substitute for the insanity defense have always
claimed that its evidentiary rule addresses the same issue as
insanity, but in a way which is less confusing to the jury.159 But
again, this claim is conceptually flawed. The diminished capac-
ity doctrine only addresses the "positive," or elements, category
of mens rea discussed earlier, and involves no claim about gen-
eral mens rea, i.e., criminal responsibility, which transcends
the elements of the crime and is only addressed at the defense
level through the affirmative defense of insanity. 160
The mens rea variant of the diminished capacity doctrine
was developed to allow a jury to consider whether a sane per-
son's mental abnormality at the time of the crime prevented
him or her from entertaining the specific mental state required
by the statutory elements of the crime. 61 But, as Professor Ste-
phen Morse notes, a person who lacks elements mens rea "is
acquitted because his conduct fails to satisfy the state's defini-
tion of the offense, not because he lacks responsibility." 62 Thus,
the mens rea variant did not create a defense that was not al-
ready constitutionally required, as every accused has a due pro-
cess right to present relevant, competent evidence to refute the
prosecution's prima facie case. 163
159. See, e.g., Spring, supra note 143, at 45.
160. PACKER, supra note 39, at 135.
161. Legal analysis of diminished capacity doctrine has often confused the
mens rea variant with the concept of partial responsibility. See Arenella, supra
note 141; Morse, supra note 85, at 7-8. Unlike partial responsibility, which asks
whether the defendant was less capable than an ordinary person of entertaining
the relevant mental state and thus deserves a lesser punishment, the mens rea
variant asks only whether the defendant in fact possessed the mens rea element of
the crime. If the prosecution fails to prove the mens rea element beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, the defendant is acquitted. See Arenella, supra note 141; Morse, supra
note 85, at 7-8.
162. Morse, supra note 85, at 8.
163. See, e.g., Mott v. Stewart, No. 98-CV-239, 2002 WL 31017646, at *6 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 30, 2002) (holding that "[t]he exclusion of evidence of mental disease or
defect"-in this case, battered women's syndrome--"offered to negate the specific
intent element of an offense," infringed on defendant's ability to present a complete
defense and was unconstitutional). Cf State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997)
(en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997).
In substituting the insanity defense with its version of the Mens Rea Model,
the Kansas statute treats this evidentiary rule as a separate defense which ex-
cludes criminal responsibility. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3221 (1996). In this way, the
Kansas statute confuses elements mens rea with general mens rea, in a manner
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Indeed, the mens rea variant was a recognition by courts
that evidence of mental disease or defect, though it does not es-
tablish insanity and therefore does not negate criminal respon-
sibility, is nevertheless relevant to negate the specific intent
element of a crime. Since specific intent crimes require proof of
a particular mental state beyond the mere intent to engage in
the proscribed conduct, whether such a mental state was pre-
sent at the time of the conduct necessarily involves a subjective,
individualized inquiry into the defendant's actual state of mind.
Psychiatric testimony which shows that the defendant, because
of mental disease or defect, did not in fact possess the required
specific intent is relevant to that inquiry. 164 Because such evi-
dence will revolve around who the defendant is and why he did
what he did, the prosecution, in order to prove that the defen-
dant actually possessed the required intent, will necessarily be
required to prove that the defendant had the capacity to form
the specific intent.165
that Professor Morse calls a "sleight of hand that tries to have it both ways," the
result of which is simply confusion. See Morse, supra note 85, at 18 n.57. This
confusion is plainly apparent in the fact that the Kansas statute authorizes auto-
matic commitment of a person found not guilty because of mental disease or defect.
KAN STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(a) (1996) ("When a defendant is acquitted and the jury
answers in the affirmative to the special question asked pursuant to K.S.A. 22-
3221 [that defendant is found not guilty because of mental disease or defect], the
defendant shall be committed to the state security hospital for safekeeping and
treatment."). This appears to be a due process violation in its own right, since a
defendant found not guilty because of mental disease or defect in Kansas is acquit-
ted because the state failed to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Aranella, supra note 141. Cf. State v. Van Hoet, 89 P.3d 606 (Kan.
2004) (though acknowledging abolition of insanity defense in Kansas, court upheld
constitutionality of automatic commitment provision after acquittal under substi-
tute Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule).
164. Arenella, supra note 141, at 833.
165. To the extent that a mental abnormality which renders a person incapa-
ble of forming specific intent may also establish insanity (see Arenella, supra note
141, at 830-31), elements of mens rea and insanity do intersect each other. How-
ever, as Arenella points out, a person may be legally insane and still be capable of
forming specific intent. Id. at 831 n.20. That is because capacity to form specific
intent, which goes to the elements of the crime, and capacity for criminal responsi-
bility, which the prosecution is not required to prove, are two different things. See
Morse & Hoffman, supra note 26, and accompanying text. See also PACKER, supra
note 39, at 135 ("[The diminished capacity] defense bears no relation to the in-
sanity defense, which is not at all addressed to particular elements of the offense
but rather to the actor's general mental condition."). It is this distinction that the
majority in Clark v. Arizona failed to acknowledge.
490
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss3/1
2008] THE INSANITY OF THE MENS REA MODEL
The Mens Rea Model simply takes the mens rea variant of
the diminished capacity doctrine, expands it to include general
intent crimes, and calls it an adequate and less confusing sub-
stitute for the insanity defense. This raises an additional con-
stitutional problem, however, above and beyond the wholesale
elimination of the fundamental category of mens rea relating to
general criminal responsibility.
Unlike specific intent crimes, general intent crimes only re-
quire proof that the individual voluntarily committed the pro-
hibited act. Because intent may be inferred from the doing of
the act, based upon the legal presumption that all persons in-
tend the natural and probable consequences of their actions, 166
the standard of liability for general intent crimes is an objective
one. This objective standard only asks what the defendant did,
not who he is or why he did what he did. 167 The defendant's
capacity to form intent is not a fact necessary to constitute a
general intent crime, and thus the prosecution has no burden to
prove that fact. On the contrary, once the prosecution proves
that the defendant committed the act, his intent will be inferred
from the commission of that act. Arguably, then, evidence of
mental disease or defect is not even relevant to general intent
crimes under the Mens Rea Model, because capacity to form in-
tent is not an issue. But if it is relevant, then the effect of the
Mens Rea Model as applied to general intent crimes is to pre-
sume the defendant guilty, and to shift the burden to the defen-
dant to disprove the mens rea element of the crime. The
defendant must prove that, as a subjective matter, he lacked
the capacity to form that element. Such burden shifting is un-
constitutional under Mullaney v. Wilbur. 68
The mens rea variant of the diminished capacity doctrine
was always limited to specific intent crimes, based on the idea
that even if evidence of mental abnormality negates the specific
intent element of a crime, the defendant will still be convicted of
a lesser included offense. But this is not necessarily true, and it
166. As long as the presumption of intent is permissive rather than
mandatory. See generally Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
167. Arenella, supra note 141, at 833 n.33 (quoting Helen Silving, Psychoa-
nalysis and the Criminal Law, 51 J. CRrM. L. C. & P.S. 19, 24 (1960)).
168. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See also, Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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is most certainly not true with general intent crimes. 169 Indeed,
if public safety was a motivating force in abolishing the insanity
defense and adopting the Mens Rea Model, then it makes no
sense. Under the Mens Rea Model, a potentially dangerous
mentally ill person, if that person's mental illness negates the
elements mens rea of a crime and there is no lesser-included
offense, will be acquitted and entitled to discharge because the
prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crime. Under the
Mens Rea Model, absence of elements mens rea may well result
in the outright discharge of a potentially dangerous mentally ill
person, who is unlikely to be treated for his or her illness. With
the insanity defense, such a person, even if he or she is found to
lack general mens rea and thus cannot be held criminally re-
sponsible, will nevertheless be subject to commitment for care
and treatment. 170
On the other side of the equation, constitutional due pro-
cess does not allow the elimination of a fundamental legal prin-
ciple of mens rea that is the very foundation of our criminal law
system: that those who lack the legal capacity for criminal re-
sponsibility lack general mens rea, a precondition for criminal
liability. Negation of criminal responsibility can only be cap-
tured as an excuse grounded in considerations of general blame-
worthiness, which are external to the elements of the crime.
Because the Mens Rea Model removes any mechanism for ne-
gating general mens rea, which is not an element of the crime
that the prosecution must prove, it denies a defendant the abil-
ity to establish as a defense that, because of mental illness, he
or she lacked the legal capacity for criminal responsibility.
169. Arenella, supra note 141, at 832 n.25. Noting that
successful application of the diminished capacity doctrine to general intent
crimes would create the anomalous result of a 'partial defense' leading to
outright acquittal.., because of the absence of a lesser included offense. To
avoid this problem, courts have [not only] refused to apply [the diminished
capacity doctrine] to general intent crimes . . . [but have also] construed
certain crimes to require only a showing of general intent to preclude appli-
cation of a diminished capacity defense.
Id.
170. See Platt, supra note 143, at 464-65.
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Conclusion
The historical development of mens rea in Anglo-American
law demonstrates an evolution of the concept into dual catego-
ries: "negative" or general mens rea, which is concerned with
legal capacity for criminal responsibility, or "moral blamewor-
thiness;" and "positive" or elements mens rea, the mental state
required as an element of a particular crime. The insanity de-
fense, because it is addressed to general mens rea, is extrinsic
to the elements of the crime. Since the prosecution has no bur-
den to prove, as an element of the crime, that a defendant pos-
sessed the legal capacity for criminal responsibility at the time
of the act, general mens rea can only be negated at the defense
level through the affirmative defense of insanity. Courts which
have upheld the constitutionality of the Mens Rea Model evi-
dentiary rule have done so based upon a conceptually flawed
analysis which fails to recognize this fundamental mens rea
duality.
With the abolition of the insanity defense and its replace-
ment with the Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule, a person
whose act was a function of a mental illness is no longer able to
defend based on his or her lack of legal capacity for criminal
responsibility. Revisiting our hypothetical in Part II, consider
the case ofA, who shot and killed B because, in an acute state of
psychosis, he believed that B was an enemy soldier. In contrast
to one who believed he was "squeezing a grapefruit," A knew B
was a human being, and clearly intended to kill him. Thus, the
mens rea element of the offense of murder was present, and A
would have no defense under the Mens Rea Model. Nor could A
invoke a self-defense claim, despite his belief that he would be
killed if he did not act, because self-defense requires a rational
belief that the force was necessary. A's belief that B was an
enemy soldier who had to be gunned down was not rational;
rather, it was an irrational act compelled by his mental illness.
A is thus relegated to a legal no man's land, with no defense,
even though, because of his mental illness, he was irrational
and unable to make a meaningful choice when he shot and
killed B. A is deemed guilty and will be punished the same as a
rational person who, with full understanding of his or her con-
duct, consciously chooses to shoot and kill another. Not only is
such a result the antithesis of centuries-old principles of crimi-
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nal liability, but it should be an intolerable result in a modern
civilized society that acknowledges mental illness as a disease
that renders its victims incapable of rational choice.
Legal capacity for criminal responsibility, or moral blame-
worthiness, is, and always has been, a precondition for criminal
liability in American jurisprudence. It is a principle deeply
rooted in the notion of human free will which lies at the heart of
our criminal law, and is therefore protected by the Due Process
Clause. The Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule eliminates this
fundamental principle of mens rea which is preserved in the
doctrine of excuses, and, in a case such as A's, must be ad-
dressed through the affirmative defense of insanity.
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